蜜桃影视

A version of this article first appeared on last month.

Ahead of the Reagan Institute鈥檚 Summit on Education commemorating the 35th anniversary of the release of 鈥淎 Nation at Risk,鈥� 蜜桃影视 is publishing a special series of articles, essays, and retrospectives about the release and the aftermath of the famous education report. See our full series here.

It鈥檚 hard to believe that this month marks 35 years since the National Commission on Excellence in Education, formed by then鈥揝ecretary of Education Ted Bell, issued its blockbuster report on education in America, 鈥淎 Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform.鈥�

Edward B. Fiske, who for 17 years was education editor of The New York Times, the report as 鈥�35 pages that shook the U.S. education world [and became] one of the most significant documents in the history of American public education.鈥�

It was unlike the usual studies, analyses, and broadsides in education. For example:

鈼徛�Instead of being directed to education experts and others in the field, the Commission called it an 鈥淥pen Letter to the American People.鈥�

鈼徛�It contained apocalyptic rhetoric like 鈥溾�� the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.鈥�

鈼徛�It used military analogies to call the nation to arms to roll back that tide and end the threat: 鈥淚f an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might have viewed it as an act of war.鈥�

Initial battles within the Reagan administration

Politically, the report caused significant early wrangles between White House aides to President Ronald Reagan, who had opposed creating a presidential commission, and Secretary Bell, who when faced with that resistance opted to employ the Department鈥檚 statutory authority to create the commission at the cabinet level.

These tussles intensified when the report didn鈥檛 focus on White House priorities for education circa 1983, namely abolishing the young Education Department itself (widely seen as a bone tossed to teachers unions for their support in the 1980 election), allowing organized prayer in schools, and supporting vouchers and tuition tax credits for private school expenses. The Department of Education had only begun operating in 1980 under Jimmy Carter鈥檚 administration.

Embracing the report

Eventually, however, as they saw the report striking a major chord with voters, White House aides embraced it. Reagan would himself attend three of 12 regional meetings convened by Bell to discuss the report. Surprisingly, he would also accept an invitation from Albert Shanker, then president of the American Federation of Teachers, to address the union鈥檚 1983 annual convention and the report鈥檚 findings.

Bell would also undertake a new initiative inspired by discussions he had on the report with the nation鈥檚 governors during their 1983 summer meeting. Many governors criticized the U.S. Department of Education for not providing yearly, reliable, national, state-by-state information in a simple and straightforward format that allowed for comparisons on multiple indicators.

This led Bell to create the Secretary鈥檚 Education Wall Chart, which contained numerous indicators that allowed for state-by-state comparisons, including information on SAT and ACT scores and the percentage of high school students in each state taking the exams, the percentage of students who lived below the poverty level, student dropout rates, minority student enrollment, teacher salaries, and more.

It was released for the first time in January 1984 at a Department of Education press conference. As Bell 鈥淭he [reporters鈥橾 reactions were sharp and animated 鈥� [including] compliments and brickbats [as well as comments by others who] described the data as the most complete they had ever seen.鈥�

Finally, the administration would make education reform into a political issue for the 1984 presidential campaign, using Reagan鈥檚 deftness in the 鈥渂ully pulpit鈥� to argue for the commission鈥檚 conclusions regarding the lackluster state of student achievement in the U.S.

Bill Bennett and the three C鈥檚

Once Reagan was re-elected, he nominated William Bennett to be the nation鈥檚 third secretary of education, coming to the department from the National Endowment for the Humanities, which he chaired during the first term.

It fell to Bennett and his team to create a formal policy agenda for K-12 education reform, an agenda that would be based on 鈥淎 Nation at Risk鈥� but also aligned with the administration鈥檚 political and policy priorities. Bennett unveiled it on March 27, 1985, in a at the National Press Club.

Bennett suggested that the traditional three R鈥檚 鈥� reading, writing, and arithmetic 鈥� a long-standing, shorthand way of reminding the nation of what K-12 students should learn, needed to be supplemented due to the new challenges facing education in America as described in 鈥淎 Nation at Risk.鈥� He called this a 鈥渘ew trilogy of ideas鈥� and summarized it as 鈥渢he 鈥渢hree C鈥檚 of content, character, and choice.鈥�

Content

For Bennett, content was about curriculum. He was clear that the federal government is prohibited from prescribing curriculum for states and localities. But he framed the content discussion by talking about how Washington can contribute to educational excellence by urging high educational standards 鈥� what the report described as 鈥渕ore rigorous and measurable standards, and higher expectations, for academic performance.鈥�

This focus included what the commission dubbed 鈥渢he five new basics鈥� 鈥� i.e., 4 years of English, 3 years of mathematics, 3 years of science, 3 years of social studies, and one half year of computer science. (Two years of language were strongly recommended for college-bound students.) Later, Bennett would make his own strong personal curricular recommendations in two publications released by the department: and . He was not at all inhibited in spelling out what he thought students should know and be able to do before graduating from high school.

Character

For Bennett, the mastering of content developed intellect, which goes hand-in-hand with developing character 鈥� what the report called 鈥渟tudent conduct鈥� while acknowledging that developing intellect is no guarantee of good character. Schools must expose children to good character and invite its imitation.

Schools must also have character themselves; that is, they must model what they want students to develop. Educators must articulate ideals to students, develop a school ethos, and transmit it to them by example. With a nod to the administration鈥檚 political posture, Bennett commented that 鈥渧oluntary school prayer [can] be an auxiliary to character in some places.鈥�

Choice

To Bennett, a key problem with schools was 鈥� and still is 鈥� that they cannot be directly held accountable by parents. A key way to improve them is 鈥渋f parents had a greater ability to choose another school 鈥� a better school.鈥� He called for a redesign of public education through 鈥渋nstruments of choice 鈥� within public education and between public and non-public education.鈥� This would include both vouchers and tuition tax credits.

He observed that many Americans already had 鈥渁 voucher 鈥� known as the ability to buy the school of their choice by buying the neighborhood of their choice.鈥� With this formulation, Bennett was again able to link the administration鈥檚 agenda to what he proposed for the Department鈥檚 K-12 policy agenda.

Finally, while not explicitly calling for the agency鈥檚 abolition 鈥� Bell had earlier failed to locate any congressional support for such a move 鈥� Bennett made clear that the role of the department vis-脿-vis the 鈥渢hree C鈥檚鈥� was 鈥渓imited by the fact that education in America has been and always should be a local and state responsibility 鈥� [and that] real reform 鈥� cannot come from inside the Department of Education in Washington. It has to come from inside our schools and our communities.鈥�

A legislative agenda

The Department went on to advance four legislative proposals grounded in the three C鈥檚 to create what Bennett called 鈥渙ur agenda for the next four years.鈥� The first two items were predictably contentious:

鈼徛�Converting traditional Title I basic grants that went to school districts and provided special financial support to schools with high percentages of children from low-income families into compensatory education vouchers worth several hundred dollars to purchase public or private education services.

鈼徛�Creating tuition tax credits whereby parents could recover up to $300 of a child鈥檚 private school tuition.

The other two items were more esoteric but garnered from significant elements of the K-12 reform community:

鈼徛�Expanding data collection for the National Assessment of Educational Progress 鈥� the nation鈥檚 report card 鈥� from providing only national and regional data on student achievement to state-specific achievement data, thereby making state-to-state student achievement comparisons possible for the first time.

鈼徛�Reorganizing the National Center for Education Statistics to address problems associated with its data-collection quality, accuracy, and publication timeliness, including significant expansion of its data-collection surveys for K-12 public and private education.

The administration failed in the first two efforts, though various Republican administrations since have continued to propose similar legislation.

Bennett and his team did, however, succeed in working with the Democratic Congress to enact the other two proposals, thereby establishing a recurring state-by-state trove of student achievement data and background information for different academic content areas. It would go on to include international assessments, making comparisons possible between U.S. students and other students around the world. (As befits this 35th anniversary, results were just released today.) This formed the basis for all types of analyses that led to debates that continue to this day about how well 鈥� or poorly 鈥� schools are preparing students for college, careers, and citizenship.

The long-term outcome

The continuing flow of solid information on K-12 education emerging from the Reagan administration鈥檚 legislative successes would become the fuel that stoked the education reform movement 鈥� or what would be called by some 鈥渢he excellence movement鈥� 鈥� to this day.

So with the three C鈥檚, Bennett and his team skillfully integrated the administration鈥檚 political agenda for education with a broader K-12 鈥渆xcellence鈥� agenda that he would magnify with his use of the bully pulpit for the remainder of the Reagan administration.

Moreover, his forceful articulation of content, character, and choice along with a legislative agenda would prove to be prescient.

For example, significant elements of that agenda were taken up by the nation鈥檚 governors under their multiyear project that spanned 1985 to 1991 called 鈥溾�� and also in their 1989 in Charlottesville, Virginia, with President George H.W. Bush.

In short, the three Cs and that legislative agenda would frame many of the education reform conversations that occurred over the following 30-plus years (and that continue even now). They would create the framework for the two key elements that would dominate education reform discussion to this day: standards-based reforms 鈥� including testing and accountability 鈥� and choice-based reforms like charter schools, vouchers, tax credits, education savings accounts, and other mechanisms that allow public dollars to be used for a variety of educational options.

Over these 35 years, the message of 鈥淎 Nation at Risk鈥� has had remarkable durability and resilience.

Bruno V. Manno served in several senior positions in the U.S. Department of Education from 1986 to 1993, observing firsthand the development of the agenda described in this piece. He is now senior adviser for the Walton Family Foundation鈥檚 K-12 program and co-author of Charter Schools at the Crossroads.

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